Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition)

“They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing”
Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition) book. Happy reading Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition) Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition) at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Alassane Ouattara : une ambition pour la Côte dIvoire (ESSAI ET DOC) (French Edition) Pocket Guide. Student leaders told Human Rights Watch that in most instances when they have reported violence to the police, they have been told that, "since FESCI is involved, you better settle it amongst yourselves.

According to witnesses, around 1 p. Meanwhile, another witness present in the house during the attack, the secretary general of the PCRCI, also attempted to contact the police:. It is a rebel organization created in the rebel zone and seeking to spread its tentacles to the university. One victim described being beaten in July after trying to distribute pamphlets at a bus station inviting students to an AGEECI press conference:.

Human Rights Watch documented several cases of sexual abuse and exploitation perpetrated by members of FESCI since , and believes the numbers and incidence of sexual abuse by its members may be significantly underreported. Students interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that FESCI members demand and extort sex from female students on campus, occasionally by threatening to kick a student out of her dorm room unless she agrees to sleep with a FESCI member. If she refuses to submit to them she is expelled from the residence and prevented from going on campus to attend her classes.

When a group of women interviewed by Human Rights Watch was asked how one could contact the school administration for protection or how to report such behavior, the interviewees all laughed and one said, "You are dreaming! The university will do nothing.

Côte d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery -

She told Human Rights Watch:. A leading local human rights NGO following this woman's case confirmed that there has been no police investigation of the complaint she registered and that her requests for action from the university and Ministry of Justice have received no response. This student gave the organization a written, detailed testimony, reviewed by Human Rights Watch. The NGO confirmed that there was no police or judicial follow-up for her case.

Since at least , FESCI has subjected to intimidation, and occasionally physical abused, of several professors and teachers because of their political beliefs or activism for better working conditions. In November , FESCI members reportedly beat with belts and clubs two high school teachers who participated in a teachers strike. A high school teacher told Human Rights Watch that in November FESCI students smashed a rock over his head during a fight that started in a restaurant after students had become drunk.

While many teachers, especially at the high school level, continue to fear FESCI-perpetrated violence, the head of a professors union at the university explained to Human Rights Watch how the presence of former FESCI members among the university professors is beginning to change professor-student relations:. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, professors, teachers, and students described the chilling effect that FESCI's actions have had on freedoms of expression and association at both the high school and university level.

Teachers at the high school level described being reluctant to discuss the performance of the current government, to suggest that the economy is doing poorly, or to address a number of other politically sensitive subjects in the classroom:. University professors interviewed by Human Rights Watch appeared less fearful to address politically sensitive topics in class, but all noted that criticizing FESCI or the political controversy surrounding its actions is off limits:.

The shadow cast by FESCI's history of violence has had a profound effect on the activities of other student organizations, from rival student unions to student religious groups, who told Human Rights Watch that after the abuses perpetrated against AGEECI, [] they have curtailed or ceased open recruitment, passing out pamphlets, and other activities that could be construed as a challenge to FESCI's dominance on campus. Beyond refraining from public acts on behalf of a rival organization, opposition supporters living in student dormitories told Human Rights Watch that they must be discreet about their political affiliation, even going so far as to making sure they do not have any books or literature in their rooms that might associate them with the opposition, to avoid being forcibly evicted by FESCI from their room: What you think, it has to be kept inside you, not expressed.

That's one of the worst things about it. You have to hide who you are for your own security and survival. Several students and professors interviewed by Human Rights Watch pointed to the role that FESCI has played in "pacifying" the university and the benefits this holds for the ruling party. At the same time, as discussed below, some members of FESCI have used their power to great personal economic benefit, often at the expense of economically deprived students. Student leaders from other organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch expressed a strong desire to openly and publicly organize and push for better student conditions, but all stated that they fear a violent reaction from FESCI.

Though the roots of some practices pre-date the outbreak of civil war in , since the crisis erupted members of FESCI have exhibited an increasing tendency to criminally appropriate and allocate key university facilities and services. Activities include racketeering of merchants and minibus drivers near university facilities, extortion of fellow students for a portion of their scholarship money, and illegal seizure and subletting of dorm rooms.

Merchants, members of a transporters union representing taxi and minibus drivers, and officials in a mayor's office working in proximity to university facilities told Human Rights Watch that they were routinely subjected to extortion and racketeering by members of FESCI, and often likened the organization to a "mafia. Merchants operating on or in close proximity to the university campus, university residences, and even high schools told Human Rights Watch that they are required to pay "taxes" to FESCI for the privilege of operating.

According to merchants interviewed by Human Rights Watch, anyone who refuses to pay risks being beaten or evicted:. Human Rights Watch interviewed two former FESCI members who once were responsible for collecting money from merchants around one university dormitory. Both described a well-organized collections system in which the "financial secretary" of an individual section of FESCI keeps a list of those merchants under FESCI control in their territory and the "taxes" due. The financial secretary then collects on a monthly or weekly basis, though this does not exclude impromptu attempts to collect off-schedule if money is needed.

In addition to the regular "taxes" that are collected at intervals, merchants told Human Rights Watch that members of FESCI often demand free services from restaurants and taxis, often going en masse to eat and drink and then refusing to pay. According to students, merchants, and civil servants working in a mayor's office, FESCI will not allow city tax collectors to collect official government taxes on their "turf. In return for "taxes" paid, FESCI "protects" the merchants by dealing with thieves and other troublemakers. At one university residence, a FESCI member described a system for judging and sentencing alleged thieves:.

Police and students told Human Rights Watch that individuals in their community are increasingly hiring members of FESCI both to provide security, as well as perform acts of thuggery. I had been threatened and I called the police. So I chose to trust my security to students. Students interviewed by Human Rights Watch allege that, on an apolitical basis, FESCI takes a portion of all student scholarship money in plain view of university officials. Students told Human Rights Watch that FESCI representatives sit right next to the area where the money is distributed by the university to collect "their share," often about 5 percent.

There are over 60, university students in the Abidjan area, yet just under 10, beds in student dormitories.

Côte d'Ivoire : Pour Alassane Ouattara, jamais deux sans trois ?

In this context of scarcity, the university administration, a division of the Ministry of Higher Education, allots nearly 4, beds to different student organizations based on a quota system. Beyond the rooms allotted under the quota system, according to the ministry, FESCI has illegally seized control of at least others beds by forcibly evicting students. FESCI's control of the dorms provides it with enormous political and financial power. Many of these rooms are rented to individuals who are either no longer students or who never were students to begin with.

With respect to political control, numerous students interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that that since , many students from the north or those suspected of supporting the political opposition, have been selectively evicted by FESCI. In February , FESCI's newly elected secretary general, Augustin Mian, participated in a ceremony in which he ceremonially handed over the key to illegally occupied rooms to university administration officials.

community recognised Alassane Ouattara as the winner of the . Before the French formally colonised Cote d'Ivoire, West Africa was .. employed indirect rule, but in a stricter form that the British version. . This upset the ambitions .. UN Doc. A/Res/60/1. The World Summit was held from 14th to the. Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record tion candidate Alassane Ouattara was recognized as the winner by the Economic Before the French formally colonized Côte d'Ivoire, the area was occupied by .. This upset the ambitions of those West African politicians who .. UN doc A/Res/60/1.

While this is a promising development, it remained unclear as of this writing what it will mean in practice, and whether it will do anything to prevent illegal occupation in the future. Since violence and criminal activity by FESCI members have often spilled over the bounds of the university environment, and have taken the form of mass mobilizations and attacks on perceived opponents of the government, including opposition politicians, judges, the media, and employees of the United Nations.

These activities, which often directly promoted the interests of the ruling FPI party, typically met with little response from police and judicial authorities. Since the political crisis erupted in , members of FESCI, together with other overtly pro-government groups such as the Young Patriots, have staged numerous violent political demonstrations in support of the government. On some occasions, these violent protests have resulted from direct public call to action by high-ranking FPI party leaders issued to all FPI partisans.

In some instances, youth protestors engaged in illegal activity such as manning unauthorized checkpoints have been provided direct logistical and other support by members of the government security forces. Pro-government youth set up a barricade on January 17, Hundreds of similar roadblocks were erected throughout Abidjan.

Human Rights Watch is aware of no instance in which the authorities arrested a member of FESCI or the Young Patriots for actions taken in January , despite paralyzing traffic for days, openly extorting passersby, and carrying clubs and other weapons. Youth have shown that they are still ready, still mobilized [to defend the republic].

In July , members of FESCI, the Young Patriots, and other pro-government youth groups once again caused major disturbances in Abidjan and other cities across the country, erecting barricades, burning cars, and forcibly disrupting the " Audiences Foraines " — public hearings for those residents, predominately from the north, who lack identification papers — that were a critical component of the peace process. Actions taken by pro-government youth groups in response to this call to arms effectively ground to a halt a national program intended to identify and provide official papers for Ivorians who have no documentation.

After the events of July , the identification process did not start again until September , this time with the blessing of President Gbagbo and his FPI party. Unlike July where a call to arms by political leaders led to massive disruptions and clashes in the street between partisans of rival parties, there have been no public protests by pro-government youth groups such as FESCI and the Young Patriots.

The power of FESCI and other "patriotic" youth groups to mobilize youth into the streets since the crisis erupted has been one of the keys to their national influence. It is due to the mass mobilizations such as those discussed above that members of FESCI and other "patriotic" groups believe that they have "saved the republic" and "kept Gbagbo in power. On several occasions since the military-political crises erupted in , members of FESCI have been responsible for attacks on opposition leaders, members of the political opposition, and rebel leaders occupying ministerial positions as part of a political accord.

In no instance that Human Rights Watch is aware of have these attacks resulted in an official investigation or any arrests. Two persons were seriously injured, and a dozen wounded as assailants attacked PDCI youth with clubs and iron rods. In February , three FESCI members were arrested, tried, and sentenced to four months' imprisonment for assault and battery of a suspected thief they had caught on campus.

Though police had been stationed around the building in anticipation of the protest, protesters surged into the building, beating several magistrates. Human Rights Watch interviewed one of the judges beaten that day, who explained that while some police tried to stop the attackers, others stood by and did nothing, while others even collaborated with FESCI and the Young Patriots:. After the incident, a magistrates' union went on strike and demanded a formal inquiry, as did the president of the bar association.

Côte d’Ivoire Post-Gbagbo: Crisis Recovery

The US embassy issued a statement denouncing "a lack of respect for the law [and the] impunity some groups enjoy. According to the magistrate beaten that day, today the complaint is "almost forgotten. Dozens of individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch, from police, to professors and students, to victims of FESCI, all asked a version of the question: On several instances in and , members of FESCI besieged and invaded buildings belonging to Ivorian print and broadcast media, often leaving a trail of damaged property in their wake. RTI agreed to broadcast a pre-recorded statement later that evening.

In his message, FESCI leader Serge Koffi announced that he had "taken" the television station and urged young people to take to the streets to demand the departure of foreign troops. In July , angry that RTI had broadcast statements from representatives of a striking professors union, members of FESCI stormed the station in an attempt to read their own statement:. According to reports, police came to the scene and negotiated with the attackers until FESCI left the newspaper's headquarters.

However, some members of both human rights groups postulate that the teachers strike was a pretext, and that FESCI's real goal was both the elimination of files and records that contained details regarding FESCI's misdeeds, as well as punishment for having publicly denounced FESCI's actions in the past. In one of the attacks, which lasted over two hours, human rights activists described to Human Rights Watch how local police stood by and watched as the destruction ensued, yet failed to intervene or otherwise try to stop FESCI members.

If police reinforcements were called, they did not arrive. Both organizations expressed surprise at the attacks. Both organizations had been involved in attempting to promote peaceful resolution to conflicts on campus and had undertaken initiatives to reduce the incidence of campus violence. One lawyer following the case for LIDHO expressed hope, but acknowledged that there will likely be severe challenges:.

Another human rights defender expressed the importance of the case advancing where others in the past have failed:. Frictions developed between AGEECI and the Student Committee, resulting in a particularly violent confrontation in August in which one member of the Student Committee was shot in the chest, but survived, and several other members of the Committee were wounded by machete.

A May clash between members of the Student Committee and other students, including a few members of AGEECI, resulted from an attempt by members of the Student Committee to determine the list of those eligible for a recently announced student aid package. Based on conflicting accounts by both sides, blame for the violent incidents of and is difficult to determine.

However, it is clear that in both instances in which the New Forces rebels intervened, they arrested only members of AGEECI and other non-Committee students, despite the fact that members of the Student Committee were also involved in the violence. In recent years, there have been increasing efforts on the part of the Ministry of Higher Education, Ivorian civil society, and occasionally even FESCI's leadership itself to curtail violence in the university context. The chief of staff for the minister of higher education told Human Rights Watch that the struggle against university violence is one of the ministry's top priorities, and that the ministry wanted to generate more university-wide dialogue on the subject.

The Observatory leads sensitization campaigns intended to increase "dialogue, peace, and tolerance" on campus. While non-violence education and government-sponsored workshops are welcome and necessary, some human rights defenders interviewed argued these initiatives must be accompanied by efforts to tackle impunity and a strong signal from FPI party leaders that violence and criminal activity on the part of FESCI's members will no longer be tolerated.

In an interview shortly after his election to the head of FESCI in May , Serge Koffi announced that he wanted to make FESCI into a "responsible union" and that the "introduction of machetes at the University had tarnished the image of the student. In FESCI turned over several members accused of crimes to the police, including murder and assault. While these are welcome words and actions, criminal offenses perpetrated by members of FESCI from up through the present suggest that much work remains to be done.

However, according to victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, those complaints almost never result in even so much as a member of FESCI being questioned by the police, let alone charged. During Human Rights Watch's investigation into FESCI perpetrated-violence, interviewees ranging from students and professors, to policemen and judges frequently asserted that much of FESCI's political power and criminal behavior stems from the fact that it is "protected by power" and "supported by the FPI.

In terms of direct support, though it is often alleged that the National Bureau of FESCI receives financial contributions from either the presidency or high-ranking members of the FPI party, no one interviewed by Human Rights Watch was able to come up with any hard evidence to support this claim. A far more pervasive form of encouragement for FESCI's activities, however, both those that appear politically motivated, as well as those with a more base criminal or pecuniary motive, is the impunity associated with nearly all offenses perpetrated by members of FESCI.

In interviews with Human Rights Watch, police, officials in a mayor's office, professors, and students referred to university residences alternatively as a "state within a state," "a foreign embassy," and a "no mans land" due to the absolute control exercised by FESCI and the inability or unwillingness of state security forces to intervene in the face of criminal conduct by FESCI members. Some police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch expressed great frustration at what they perceive to be their inability to take action against FESCI-perpetrated abuses:.

Other police officers and judges interviewed by Human Rights Watch provided similar testimony. One high-ranking police officer noted that, "If they would give us the green light to take care of things we could settle the problem, but we can't take action because we know they are protected by the party in power.

When Human Rights Watch visited the scene in July , hundreds of holes were still visible in tin roofs, metal doors, concrete walls, and anything else within 15 to 20 meters of where the shells exploded. Before an individual or security force unit was named as responsible for certain crimes, Human Rights Watch corroborated the information from independent sources, including victims, eyewitnesses, and other perpetrators involved. By late October, 3, FN soldiers identified for integration into the national army were cantoned—albeit not on a sustained basis, due to insufficient resources, and the number of FN command zones was also reduced from 10 to 4. A White House statement on the meeting did not address the issue of possible U. He suggested that he might be willing to entertain a negotiated solution to the crisis and called for Ouattara and himself to "sit down and discuss" a way out of the crisis with him.

Judges and police interviewed by Human Rights Watch explained that authorities typically fail to take action against crimes by FESCI members for a mixture of reasons. Some expressed fear for their career, others fear for personal or family safety, and others simply the unpredictability of taking action against those they believe to have enormous political cover. As alluded to in the account above, there is belief held by members of FESCI and others interviewed that by mobilizing street demonstrations at key junctures since the crisis erupted in , FESCI and other members of the "patriotic galaxy" have "saved the institutions of the republic" in general, and the Gbagbo government in particular.

The National Director of Police explained that:. However, there seems to be a general feeling among former members of FESCI interviewed that mass protests and mobilizations have nevertheless landed blows in a moral and public relations battle against the rebellion. In addition, as described in this report, FESCI and other members of the patriotic galaxy have mobilized to stymie the peace process at key junctures, often in ways that helped the FPI gain traction at politically precarious moments.

For this reason, many of those interviewed, from policemen to students, maintain that the government is reluctant to take legal action against members of FESCI both as a sort of recompense for actions taken on behalf of the government in the past, as well as the fact that FESCI's capacity to mobilize youth may be needed again in the future. As one judge put it:. Other political observers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including professors and diplomats, stated that the FPI is unlikely to bring members of FESCI to justice now because they may need to call upon FESCI's mobilization capacity and muscle during upcoming elections, currently scheduled in late November.

Indeed, many of FESCI's activities have been publicized in local media and were known to judicial and police authorities interviewed by Human Rights Watch. A frequent taunt FESCI members use, as repeated by dozens of students, teachers, and others interviewed by Human Rights Watch is, "We can beat you, and nothing will happen. We can kill you, and nothing will happen. One such instance involved the June killing of an accused thief on campus, and the second the October beating of two Abidjan city SOTRA bus drivers.

However, while these are welcome developments, such actions remain the exception rather than the rule. Since the crisis erupted, FESCI has had an at times contradictory relationship with the police, with authorities in limited circumstances seeking to curb FESCI's more nefarious activities, but more often turning a blind eye to them. On still other occasions, frictions between members of the police and FESCI have degenerated into attacks and skirmishes. These dynamics were well illustrated by events in August and August In August , FESCI members attacked and ransacked an Abidjan police station, smashing windows of cars and buildings in the vicinity, in order to free two fellow members who had just been arrested for failure to stop their car for a police inspection.

No one has been questioned or arrested in connection with the attack. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, the then National Director of Police, Yapo Kouassi, said that he gave the order to free the students because "there are extremists in FESCI who could unleash violence all over Abidjan, which would jeopardize our fragile peace. If I had really wanted to do that, things would have been a lot worse. In some instances, state security forces have acted in tandem with FESCI or other non-state groups to commit violations of human rights.

At times, FESCI members have benefited from the complicity of police officers or other authorities, also implicating the government in human rights abuses. But organizations like FESCI, even if supportive of the government, are not state actors and do not bear direct responsibility under international law for application and violation of international treaties.

Rather, members of FESCI responsible for acts such as murder, rape, assault, and extortion should be held responsible by the state under Ivorian criminal law. This has especially been true when these crimes are directed against northerners, Muslims, and other perceived opponents of the ruling FPI party. International law recognizes state accountability for failing to protect persons from rights abuses and violence by private actors.

According to the UN Human Rights Committee, the international expert body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, states are required "to respect and to ensure" the rights provided under the covenant. To meet this obligation, a state must not only protect individuals against violations of rights by its agents, but "also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights.

"The Best School"

Ultimately, the sense shared by many Ivorians that pro-government groups like FESCI are effectively "above the law" due to their allegiance to the ruling party undermines respect for bedrock institutions essential to building the rule of law such as independent and impartial courts and rights-respecting police. Many of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including police, judges, professors, students, and officials from the ministries of higher education and of justice, noted that FESCI in its current violent and hegemonic form could not survive for long without the impunity from university disciplinary measures and criminal prosecution its members enjoy.

The youth wings of several major political parties either are or have been headed by former FESCI leaders. Beyond these "headliners," former members of FESCI are increasingly represented within the administration of different government ministries, and within security forces such as the police and the gendarmerie. Many of those interviewed, from police to professors and students, complained about the favoritism they allege FESCI members have had since in gaining entry to the training schools for the police and the gendarmerie, as well as the prestigious National School of Administration ENA , an elite institution intended to train high-level civil servants.

It remains to be seen whether these young leaders can move beyond this "training" as they enter their professional lives. The PDCI also contributed to what they have become today. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the international community is largely a hypothetical community or at best a theoretical community of uneven and sometimes unwilling or reluctant members. There is no provision in international law for the establishment of this community, though the UN Charter has been said to be a constitution of the international community.

Nevertheless, this international community is the holder of much of the secondary responsibility of R2P i. Furthermore, in the case of prevention the responsibility of the international does not remain latently waiting for a trigger, but is a constant complement to a parent states responsibility. If the responsibility of the international community is not researched and accepted, the identity of the international community may well turn into a situation where nobody does anything substantial to prevent mass atrocity and conflict.

At the end of the day, nobody would do what anybody could have done and everybody should have done. Parameters have to be defined to avoid farcical finger-pointing and arm- folding. In cases where the UN is unable, unwilling or not suited to act as the nucleus or pivot, the organism changes character.

For example when a regional organisation such as ECOWAS exhibits the characteristics of the international community within its region without recourse to the UN except for retrospective approval, binary fission occurs, splitting the international community into different organisms with different self- interests. This in itself may have a negative effect on other volatile situations around the world. The role of the UN as central guardian of international security is significant. Though it may be that in some situations the UN can only play a supervisory role, it should never be left out of the equation.

Nevertheless, none of the documents on R2P have given a clear indication of the nucleus entity of R2P especially in non-military preventive action; the nucleus is pivotal in deciding what the international community is in relation to R2P and if that entity remains static or changes on a case-by-case basis. In this sense the urgency to ensure regional stability will lessen in proportion to the ripple effect of insecurity as it moves out of the region to the outer edges of the world. Neither is there any agreed definition on what it is. The legal burden behind the responsibility to prevent highlights the difference between the legal obligation to act in international law and the public expectation to act; who international law stipulates has an obligation to act may differ from the entity addressed in reports such as the R2P report or calls for action by groups such as Human Rights Watch.

Some Lessons Journal of Peace Research. On the other hand preventive action may not necessarily involve or even need military might or significant financial superiority. In his report on the prevention of armed conflict the then UNSG, Annan, stated that prevention requires cooperation between various state and non-state actors on the international scene; while the UN is pivotal, it is not always the organisation suited to lead international multilateral preventive action, preventive capabilities reside in other institutions as well as differing UN entities.

The question remains if they would be able to bear such responsibility working in isolation or in concert. Who the international community is, taken from a literal interpretation of community could be obscured by the expectation or the reality of all these entities acting together. This is further obscured by a differentiation of the entities that can act and those that cannot; those that will act and those that will not. The fact that the legal burden put on individuals, states and organisations differs makes it an uneven community of personalities; though this does not affect the legal force of any agreement concluded between such personalities.

An actor on the international scene may have both capacity and political will, one of them or neither. While the binding nature of the UNSC resolution may be of potential significance to the acceptance of the responsibility to protect, it does not add much to the definition of the international community in respect of the responsibility to protect. The I te atio al Co u it a d Mass At o ities. National and International Perspectives. Besson and Marti Eds. International Studies Review 11 1: Addis Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction.

Human Rights Quarterly 31 1: Nijman and Nollkaemper Eds. European Journal of International Law 9: This is considered to be the major thrust of a responsibility to prevent; a negative obligation by states and the international community to refrain from committing genocide, war crimes, CAHs and ethnic cleansing.

When viewed from a human rights perspective it is an obligation not to violate any of the component rights that comprise the R2P crimes. One may well ask if this is the sole legal content of the responsibility to prevent. To answer this query, we have to consider the content of the obligation to protect. The ICISS on the other hand when expounding on the responsibility to prevent did not propose a critical legal definition of this responsibility entailed but suggested forms in which the responsibility could be exercised. The Commission suggested developmental assistance, advancement of democratic rule, mediation efforts, inducements and similar measures to prevent the violations of human rights.

Subsistence, Affluence, and U. These conventions primarily provide rules for the protection of human rights by stating what a human right is and exhibiting what would amount to a violation.

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Furthermore, the conventions have within their corpus, provision for monitoring or and ensuring the adherence of members states. On the other hand there is only so much that the UN and its subsidiaries can do to ensure compliance by member states if states do not wish to be bound or do not consider it in their best interests to be bound. International law is not too explicit when defining the extraterritorial obligations of states to prevent violations of human rights that occur within the territory of states.

However, as has been discussed above the international community has an obligation to prevent human rights violations. Encouraging democratisation without the use of force Due to the nature of post-colonial West African states, democratically elected governments recognised by the rest of the world are quite a new introduction to the political landscape. Good governance itself has been cited by the IMF and the World Bank as a requirement for economic development of any state.

The Round Table 94 World Bank Research Observer 23 1: However, the choice of democracy for post-colonial African states has been rife with controversy. Imposition of democracy can become a violation of fundamental freedoms. Journal of International Studies 37 3: Human Rights Quarterly This is not to deny the fact that bad governance in itself may cause the occurrence of the four crimes of R2P, but to emphasise the fact that good governance and apparent democracy are not synonymous.

Ogundiya states that good governance is impossible where democracy is not comprehended by political elite who are unable to achieve the essence of the state. While governmental actors have enough legitimacy and clout to encourage democracy in states, there has to be adequate research and evaluation of the political culture to ensure that democratization does not cause more problems than it solves by hiding atrocities under a facade of acceptability.

The veil of elections has to be lifting to ensure that there produce accountable and equitable sovereign governments. Fi all a Light at the End of the Tunnel? The international community seems to have investigated thoroughly neither the claims of both the Constitutional Council nor those of the electoral commission before reaching its conclusion.

At the beginning of masses of protest swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Protesters in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya called for the ousting of their long-reigning autocratic rulers and the entrenchment of democracy. The protests in North Africa and the Middle East, are examples of internal outcry for democracy, and seem to be a better model for achieving textbook democracy. Secondly the democratic elections as prescribed by the international community and international human rights law have been held; technically the letter of the law has been fulfilled.

This does not seem to have solved the problems of imminent violence on ground. In fact there is no assurance that the international community is seeking anything other than the removal of Gbagbo and the institution of Ouattara as president. One civil society co-ordinator has asserted that the welfare of Ivorians have been bypassed in favour of ensuring that elections are held. A return to internal conflict seems imminent; an influx of refugees has begun arriving in G e , B.

There is no indication that ensuring that Ouattara becomes president will end Ivorian woes — he was Prime Minister from — under Houphouet-Boigny. These problems cause democracy to be eschewed and have to be solved to ensure democracy. What is the effect of the technical constitutional legality of the election results?